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Abstract
The following paper pertains to the area of philosophy of mind1. Specifically, this paper
examines the debate between the reductionist and the anti reductionist about mechanisms. This
topic is elucidated and discussed in the literature of several outstanding philosophers in the field,
namely: Bechtel, Couch, Craver and Lipton. It is important to note that this paper takes aim at
entity reduction rather than theory reduction and examines two distinct views of levels of
entities. This paper will go beyond examining the two views, I will offer my own rationale for
why one of the two views is the better way to think about reduction of entities to lower level
ones.
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Introduction
I want to begin this paper by motivating why exactly this debate about entity reduction is
important for the layman. It is important because of the foundational implications of each distinct
view on our understanding of the mind-body connection. If the reductionist account is true, then
we must explain mental states using the framework of a reductionist like Francis Crick who once
said, “You’, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of
1 Philosophy of Mind- A branch of philosophy that studies the nature of the mind (mental events, mental
functions, mental properties and consciousness) and its relationship to the physical body. It intersects to
some extent with the fields of neurobiology, computer science and psychology.
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personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve
cells and their associated molecules.”(Crick, 1994). However, If the anti-reductionist account is
true we therefore have to understand the mind as more than just its molecular structure, but also
by the behavior of the whole mind, as the whole has a different function than its individual parts.
There are very smart reasons to support either the reductionist camp or the anti-reductionist
camp. The structure of this paper will be as follows: In Part A), I will explain what the
reductionist account of explanation consists of, and then say something about the notion of
levels, then I will examine the view’s content. In Part B), I will explain what the anti-reductionist
account of explanation consists in, and cover the importance of causal relations in this context,
then I will examine the view’s content. Afterwards, I will present my argument for the account of
mechanistic explanation that is correct and the reasons why I believe it to be so. My view is that
the anti-reductionist account is the best view of explanation and in this section I will set about
proving my claim with a syllogism. In the conclusion section, I will revisit what we have
examined in this paper, then I will recount my view of the debate with the intention of having
convinced the reader of the superior rationality of anti-reductionism.
Part A) The Reductionist Account
I will start the work of Part A) by stating what we mean when we discuss the notion of
“reduction of entities” in the discussion of mechanisms2. Afterwards I will provide some
important details about the concept of levels in the discussion of mechanisms, as it is necessary
for getting a solid understanding not only of Part A) but also Part B) of this paper. Thereafter, I
will examine the view of mechanistic explanation that the reductionist account holds. So what
2 “This sense, however, is importantly different from the sense involved in the theory-reduction model. It
focuses not on the derivability of onetheory from another but on decomposing a mechanism into parts and
operations that explain why the mechanism behaves in a particular way. Recharacterizing reduction in
mechanistic terms, though, radically reconfigures the debate between reduction and independence.”
(Bechtel, 2007, p.142)
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does one mean when they are talking about reduction in terms of entities? Well, the clearest way
to define it is the following: entities of a specific kind, are more or less identical to entities of a
basic kind, therefore the entities of a basic kind can denote entities of a specific kind. There are
several examples of different accounts of the notion of levels put forward in the literature, the
goal of these accounts is to demarcate levels in some basic sense. I believe the best account put
forward in the literature about how to demarcate levels in the discussion of mechanisms, is the
following statement about levels “the working parts of a mechanism do different things than does
the whole mechanism.” (Bechtel, 2007, p.146). This account does work in demarcating levels
insofar as it shows the connection between the parts and the whole in terms of what they do, in
other words the behavior of the whole is the higher-level and is distinct from the behavior of the
parts which consist in the lower-level of the mechanism. I would also like to further elucidate the
nature of the part-whole relation with an example of it, “The eye consists of a number of parts
that are organized to form the whole mechanism. Due to this organization the eye has properties
that are distinct from the properties of its parts.”(Couch, unpublished, pg.3). This example is
perfect for illustrating the part-whole relation because it notes that each part of this eye has
differences i.e. the pupils, the retina, and the lens of the eye all behave differently, but when they
are all working together the functionality of vision becomes realized. Now there is much more to
be said about the importance of levels in this discussion than I present here (For further
discussion of levels see Bechtel p.143 4.4 “Levels of Organization in Mechanisms”). I will
refocus the discussion back to the reductionist account of mechanistic explanation and tie it in
with this understanding of levels. The reductionist account of explanation can be described in its
relation to levels as put forward as the following “Reductive explanations, in particular, may be
the explanation of macro effects in terms of micro causes” (Lipton, 2009, pg.115) this explains
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what the reductive account consists of, if we refer back to the Crick quote in the introduction of
this paper we can see this type of explanation in context. The reductionist will explain
higher-level effects using lower-level effects, therefore reducing the whole to the effects of its
parts.
Part B) The Anti-Reductionist Account
In order to give a precise explanation of what the anti-reductionist account of mechanistic
explanation consists in, the structure of Part B) will cover several important topics. I will state
what it means when we label an account of mechanistic explanation as anti-reductionist.
Afterwards, I will engage in discussion of causation3, in particular causal relations, as it is crucial
for developing an understanding of the anti-reductionist account. Then, I will examine the view
of explanation that the anti-reductionist account holds. When we are talking of the
anti-reductionist account of explanation, it's important to note what we don’t mean by it. It is not
a view that claims the parts of a mechanism don’t constitute the whole. The claim of the
anti-reductionist view can be stated as: the whole behaves in a different way than the behavior of
the parts.wholes are in some sense, more than merely the behavior of the parts. This is the view
accepted by Bechtel, he thinks you must understand the higher level behavior of the whole, and it
can’t be explained by the lower level behavior of the parts. A clearer way of stating the content
of this account “Wholes have causal powers that are in addition to the causal powers of the parts
individually.” (Couch). Now, I will discuss the topic of causal relations, I do so in order to fully
elucidate the distinction of the anti-reductionist account of mechanistic explanation from the
reductionist one. The notion of causal relations4 brought about when discussing mechanistic
4 For a more in depth discussion of casual relation in terms of anti-reduction accounts of mechanistic
explanation see (Couch 7.2 Causation at different levels)
3 While it is important for one to understand the nature of causation, I will not be providing a general
account of causation in this paper. The causal account I am referring to in this section of the paper:
Causation exists as the relevant event(s) that explains the effect(s), it exists not as something out in the
world but as the relation between representations.
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explanation, is something that demonstrates the distinct nature of the whole from that of its parts,
“wholes have causal powers that their parts individually do not have” (Craver, 2007, 214). This
quote from Craver’s account of causal relations elucidates the distinction between the anti
reductionist and the reductionist because it emphasizes that the whole mechanism can enter into
casual relations that its individual parts cannot, so to explain the behavior of the whole
mechanism using its individual parts would fail to explain these higher-level causal relations that
are entered into. The anti-reductionist account of multiple levels of explanation can be seen as
motivated by the necessity to account for “what it’s like'' in the context of explaining the mind.
An explanation of the mind that an anti-reductionist would agree with is the following: The mind
is a property that occurs when you get a certain series of parts together, further minds are in fact
properties of physical systems, but can’t be reduced to the parts of those systems.
Argument
The argument I would like to give about the two views of mechanistic explanations that
have been examined in this paper (reductionist, anti-reductionist), is an original argument. The
argument is deductive and is not a reiteration of a past argument pulled from the literature, these
thoughts are my own. I will present my argument in the form of a syllogism:
1. Reductionist accounts reject that the behavior of the whole has effects in addition to the
behavior of its parts
2. The whole does behave in ways in addition to the behavior of its individual parts, it enters
into causal relations with distinct effects
3. Anti-reductionist accounts are incorporate the distinct ways in which the whole behaves from
the behavior of its individual parts
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4. Therefore, anti-reductionist accounts are the correct way to think about mechanistic
explanations.
The reason why I am inclined to present this argument as the best way to understand which is the
better account, is because it demonstrates the explanatory advantage that anti-reductionist
accounts have over reductionist accounts. It does work in showing that the reductionist fails to
provide an explanation that accounts for the causal relations that the whole enters into that have
distinct effects than that of its parts.
Conclusion
The project of this paper was to examine the debate between the reductionist and the
anti-reductionist accounts of mechanistic explanation and give an argument for which account is
the better way to think about mechanistic explanations. In the course of this paper, I gave an
overview of important notions that are used in the debate about mechanistic explanations i.e.
levels, and causal relations. Part A) of this paper set out to give an encompassing and fair
account of the reductionist view of mechanistic explanation and the smart reasons that lead
people to promulgating it. Part B) of this paper presented an overview of what an
anti-reductionist account consists of and the smart reasons why it might be understood as the
most powerful explanatory account of mechanisms. Afterwards, I presented a syllogistic
argument for my own reasons why I support the anti-reductionist account of mechanistic
explanations. This syllogism presented the reasons why I see the anti reductionist account has
greater explanatory power because of its ability to explain the distinct behaviors of the whole.
To sum up, the nature of this debate and its implications about our understanding of the mind, the
two views examined lead us to philosophical frameworks that either allow us to ponder the
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intellect as something more than a physical substance, or we must accept that the intellect is
constituted entirely by embodied organs.
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